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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Mr. Blair's petition for review
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-a-3(2)(a) and § 34A-2-801(8).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Blair asserts that the Commission's denial of his proposed surgery was the
result of multiple errors that culminated in upholding a defense that was not raised by the
pleadings. In support, Mr. Blair asserts five issues:
1.

Issue: Mr. Blair put his industrial low back aggravations/injuries at L3/4 and
L4/5 at issue when he asserted that these injuries were caused by the
accident and required surgery, and Respondents' admission that there was no
medical cause defense to these injuries waived their right to later challenge
the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's admitted industrial injuries at L3/4 and
L4/5.
Standard of review: This Court should review the Commission's
determination that Respondents did not waive their medical cause defense
for reasonableness. Under the case of Barnard and Burk Group, Inc. v.
Labor Comm % 2005 UT App. 401, If 5, 122 P.3d 700, 702, this Court
reviewed the Commission's determination as to affirmative defenses for
reasonableness and rationality. In that case, the employer argued that it had
raised a statute of limitations defense in its answer. But the answer did not
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contain the correct statutory citation or version of the affirmative defense.
Nor did the answer state its defense with sufficient accuracy and detail so
that the Petitioner and Division were fully informed of that defense. The
Commission held that the defense was not raised under its Rules, and this
Court affirmed. Similarly, Petitioner asserts that in this case, Respondents'
Answer, which failed to identify the defense of medical causation, and
instead, only defended the claim on whether the surgery was "appropriate,"
amounted to a waiver of that defense. Because medical causation between
the accident and the low back aggravation/injuries at L3/4 and L/4/5 were
admitted by Respondents, it was unreasonable for the Commission to raise
the medical causation defense before the Medical Panel.
2.

Issue: The Commission applied the wrong legal standard (medical causation)
to Mr. Blair's subsequent surgery claim, and in any case, Respondents'
Answer waived medical causation as a defense to Mr. Blair's surgery claim.
Standard of review: This Court should review the Commission's legal
determination of the applicable standard for correctness because an agency's
interpretation of legal standards are given no deference. See, e.g., State v.
Wodscow, 896 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1995) ("The issue of correct legal
standard for binding over a defendant at a preliminary hearing is one of law .
.. [T]his question is reviewed de novo with no deference to the district
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court.") Similarly, the question of whether the Commission applied the
correct legal standard to subsequent injury claims should be reviewed for
correctness, and no deference should be given to the Commission's
interpretation. Accord, Esquivel v. Labor Comm yn, 2000 UT 47.
3.

Issue: The Interim Findings were legally inadequate because they failed to
set forth the undisputed facts that set forth Petitioner's industrial injuries,
and subsequent eight year history of leg and low-back symptoms.
Standard of review: If this Court agrees that Mr. Blair's industrial injuries
were identified and admitted in the pleadings, then it should review the
Commission's failure to find those facts under a reasonableness standard.
Barnard and Burk, see discussion supra, at issue 1. Also, this Court reviews
denial of benefits for substantial prejudice where the agency action is
arbitrary and capricious. In the case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d
1 (UT App. 1991), this Court reviewed the Labor Commission's Findings of
Fact for legal adequacy. In that case, the findings failed to identify the
nature of the industrial claim, and what facts supported its conclusion that
the injuries were not medically caused by the employees employment. This
Court noted that the Commission's findings must disclose the steps taken by
the Commission to evaluate the evidence so that reviewing courts may
conduct a meaningful review. Similarly, in this case, this Court should
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review the ALJ/Commission's findings that the accident was not the medical
cause of Petitioner's L3/4 and L4/5 aggravation/injuries, and should
determine whether the Commission's wholesale rejection of both admitted
facts and undisputed medical and non-medical record evidence was an abuse
of the Commission's discretion.
4.

Issue: The Commission's Findings were premised on legal error and
inadequate as a matter of law because the Commission failed to explain why
it rejected undisputed record evidence of Mr. Blair's eight years of leg and
low-back symptoms following the accident, and when it found that Mr.
Blair's leg symptoms had "essentially resolved" within months after the
accident.
Standard of review: If this Court agrees that Mr. Blair's industrial injuries
were identified and admitted in the pleadings, then it should review the
Commission's failure to find those facts under a reasonableness standard.
Barnard and Burk, see discussion supra, at issue 1. Also, this Court should
review the Commission's rejection of undisputed record evidence without
explanation, for abusive discretion. Adams, see discussion supra at issue 3.
This Court should also review the Commission's finding that Mr. Blair did
not have an eight year history of leg and low-back symptoms, for abusive
discretion. Under Adams, this Court must reverse if the findings failed to
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disclose the steps taken by the Commission to reach its conclusions,
including why it rejected undisputed record evidence.
5.

Issue: It is inappropriate to require marshaling of the evidence under Mr.
Blair's facts because the findings as to leg and low-back symptoms were
inadequate as a matter of law, and the finding that Petitioner's leg symptoms
"essentially resolved" was premised on legal error and was not supported by
substantial evidence.
Standard of review: If this Court agrees that Mr. Blair's industrial injuries
were identified and admitted in the pleadings, then it should review the
Commission's failure to find those facts under a reasonableness standard.
Barnard and Burk, see discussion supra, at issue 1. It is inappropriate to
require appellant's to determine whether substantial evidence supported the
flawed findings. Substantial evidence review presumes that the Commission
did not abuse its discretion in objecting undisputed record evidence.
Consequently, Mr. Blair does not need to marshal the evidence to challenge
this finding. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 ^ 1720, 390-1. On the other hand, where there is no record evidence to support a
Commission's finding, it is impossible to marshal the evidence. In this case,
Mr. Blair found no evidence to support the Panel's conclusion that his leg
and low back symptoms "essentially resolved" within months of his
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accident. Accordingly, Mr. Blair has identified the undisputed record
evidence, and that evidence supports the inescapable conclusion that this
finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401.
UAR 602-2-1C.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case:
This case presents multiple related issues that stemmed from the Commission's
insistence on adjudicating claims and defenses that were resolved by the pleadings, and
not presented for adjudication. Mr. Blair asserts that Respondents admitted the nature and
scope of his low back injuries in their Answer when he put those injuries at issue and
Respondents failed to challenge the medical cause of those injuries. Thereafter, the ALJ's
findings failed to incorporate these admitted facts, and effectively raised medical causation
as a defense to Mr. Blair's surgery claims, despite Respondents expressed waiver of that
defense. The ALJ also failed to apply the correct legal standard of "contributing cause"
for subsequent medical treatment, where the accident and injury were established, as here.
The ALJ improperly delegated her fact finding duties to the Medical Panel. The Medical
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Panel's findings as to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries were premised
on legal error because the accident and his injuries had already admitted by Respondents.
Its findings that Mr. Blair did not experience leg and low-back symptoms in the eight years
following the accident, required it to reject the undisputed medical evidence and hearing
testimony, and they did so without explanation. Its finding that Mr. Blair's low-back and
leg symptoms had "essentially resolved" within months of the accident was contradicted
by the undisputed medical evidence and Petitioner's undisputed testimony, and was not
supported by substantial evidence.
Court of Proceedings and Statement of Facts:
On February 15, 2007, Petitioner / Appellant Ollie Blair, ("Mr. Blair"), brought a
claim for low back surgery and injections, along with related temporary total disability
compensation and permanent partial compensation following his surgery. In his
Application, he asserted that he aggravated/injured his low back in the May 12, 1999
industrial accident and that he needed low-back surgery at L3/4 and L4/5 as a result of his
industrial injuries. ( R 1-7). Respondents Answer admitted that the accident was the
medical cause of Mr. Blair's low-back aggravations/injuries. Respondents denied liability
for recommended surgery because it would not relieve Mr. Blair's symptoms, and
therefore was "inappropriate." ( R 10-18). The Petitioner was the sole witness at the
hearing, and the parties stipulated to admission of the 94 page Medical Records Exhibit.
( R 113). The parties represented that the central disputed was whether the proposed
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medical treatment was "appropriate" and that this narrow issue required a referral to a
Medical Panel. TR.53-55 ( R 113).
From that point, Petitioner asserts that the case was asset by legal error and abusive
discretion. On October 31, 2007, the ALJ entered her Findings of Fact and Interim Order.
( R 36-39). Mr. Blair asserts that the findings were inadequate as a matter of law. The
findings also failed to recognize Respondents' admission that Petitioners low back injuries
at L3/4 and L4/5 were medically caused by the industrial accident. ( R 10-18). On
December 19,2007, in the Panel referral letter, the ALJ asked the Panel to determine
whether the entirety of Mr. Blair's past and future medical treatment was medically caused
by his industrial accident. ( R 59-60). On March 7, 2008, the Medical Panel issued its
report. ( R 61-63). Petitioner asserts that the Panel made findings that rejected the
uncontradicted evidence without explanation as to Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg and
low-back symptoms, and that its conclusion that Mr. Blair's symptoms had "essentially
resolved" within months of the accident was not supported by substantial evidence.
On May 6, 2008, the ALJ accepted the Panel Report into evidence over Mr. Blair's
objections, and issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. ( R 73-77).
That Order denied his claim for recommended surgery because Mr. Blair failed to prove
that his industrial accident was the medical cause of his need for surgery. On June 5,
2008, Petitioner filed his Motion for Review. ( R 78-87). On June 25, 2008, Respondents
filed their Reply to Petitioner's Motion for Review. ( R 88-94). Petitioner's Motion for
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Review was pending for over two years.
On July 15, 2010, the Commission issued it Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. ( R
108-111). That Order affirmed the ALJ's denial of the recommended surgery. The Order
asserted that the Commission could accept the Panel Report into evidence, and that its
Findings and Conclusions were adequate, and supported by substantial evidence. This
appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Blair asserts that there were multiple related issues that arose from the
Commission's insistence on adjudicating defenses that were waived in the pleadings and
presented for adjudication. Mr. Blair argues that after he put his aggravations / injuries at
L3/4 and L4/5 at issue in his Application for Hearing, that Respondents admission that the
accident was the medical cause of his injuries established that the accident was the cause
of his low bac aggravations / injuries at L3/4 and L4/5. Mr. Blair also argues that the
ALJ's findings, which did not incorporate these admitted facts were premised on legal
error, and that they were inadequate as a matter of law. Mr. Blair argues that the ALJ also
erred when she asked the Medical Panel to determine the medical cause of Mr. Blair's
need for surgery, and effectively raised medical causation as an affirmative defense to Mr.
Blair's claims. Mr. Blair also argues that the ALJ erred when she applied the "medical
cause" to a standard accident, instead of the "contributing cause" standard established be
decades of appellant court precedent. Mr. Blair also argues that the Medical Panel's
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findings were inadequate as a matter of law because the Panel rejected undisputed
evidence without explanation to conclude that Mr. Blair did not suffer from leg and lowback symptoms for the eight years following his industrial accident. Mr. Blair also argues
that the Medical Panel's finding that his symptoms had "essentially resolved" within
months of the accident, was contradicted by the undisputed record evidence and not
supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Blair asks this Court to vacate the Commission's
findings to the extent they adjudicated the medical cause of Mr. Blair's industrial low back
injuries. Mr. Blair also asks this Court to remand the case for additional findings
consistent with the undisputed record evidence and to submit the correct legal issue to the
Medical Panel as to whether the proposed surgery was "appropriate" given Mr. Blair's
admitted low back injuries.

xv

ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL WAS THE RESULT OF MULTIPLE
ERRORS THAT CULMINATED IN UPHOLDING A DEFENSE
THAT WAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT.
L

Mr. Blair Asserted That His Industrial Injuries Included L3/4 and L4/5,
and Respondents9 Admission That There Was No Medical Cause
Defense Was Acquiescence To Those Medical Facts.

This Court should hold that Respondents admitted that Mr. Blair's aggravations or
injuries to his low back at L3/4 and L4/5 were part of his industrial injuries, when it
waived its affirmative defense of medical causation. The MRI following the accident
showed that Mr. Blair had bulging discs at L3/4 and L4/5, and a herniated disc at L5/S1.
MRE 18 ( R 112). Mr. Blair put the scope of his industrial injuries at issue when he
presented medical evidence that connected his L3/4 and L4/5 aggravations or injuries to
the industrial accident. ( R 1-7). Dr. Levitt opined that Mr. Blair needed surgery at these
levels "as a result of the industrial accident." ( R 7). Respondents could have disputed
whether the injuries to L3/4 and L4/5 were medically caused by the accident, but they did
not. To the contrary, the Answer admitted that there was no medical causal defense to
Petitioner's low back injuries. ( R 10-18). Respondents failed to dispute that the accident
was the medical cause of Petitioner's aggravations or injuries at L3/4 and L4/5.1

1

Had Respondents raised medical causation as a defense, then it would have
been appropriate for the Commission to first determine the nature and scope of
Petitioner's industrially caused injuries, and second, whether the proposed surgery was
appropriate. Instead, Respondents only challenged Mr. Blair's surgery because they
claimed it would not give him relief of his symptoms. See discussion infra, this Section.
1

Consequently, Respondents waived any right to dispute that Petitioner aggravations or
injuries at L3/4 and L4/5 were caused by the industrial accident.
Respondents' Answer specifically waived medical causation as a defense to Mr.
Blair's surgery when they admitted liability for Mr. Blair's industrial low back injuries,
and raised only whether the surgery was "appropriate" to treat his industrial injuries:
The Respondents admitted liability for the Petitioner's claim.
They understand that the issue is whether the Petitioner should
have surgery to treat his industrial injury. Attached is a report
from Gerald Moress, M.D., which concludes that surgery is
not appropriate to treat the Petitioner's industrial injury.
Answer at 1 ( R 10). Dr. Moress' report stated in pertinent part:
I do not feel that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-L4 and L4L5 will relieve Mr. Blair's discomfort. The discectomies
would be done in order to relieve the discomfort in his left
lower extremity where he has no clear evidence of
radiculopathy based on reflex changes, atrophy, weakness,
sensory dermatomal changes, or abnormal electrical study.
Even if I assume that his discomfort in his leg was related to
his disc disease, he would get no relief of his back pain from
the surgery. He would be unhappy with that result. I do not
feel that surgery is a good option for him.
Answer at 8. ( R 17). In closing arguments, Respondents' counsel restated the foregoing
admission of medical cause: "We don't dispute that the accident hurt his back, but with Dr.
Moress's report, what he's saying is that the surgery is not appropriate to treat the
industrial injury." Tr. 53 ( R 113). Respondents never disputed that Petitioner aggravated
or injured L3/4 and L4/5 in the accident. There was no medical cause or causal

2

contribution defense before the Commission.2 Instead, the defense was whether the
proposed surgery was appropriate.
In this case, the Commission simply got it wrong. It asserted that "Even though
[Respondents] admit that the accident medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a low-back
injury, such an admission does not imply that the accident caused all of Mr. Blair's lowback problems following the accident." Order Affirming ALJ's Decision ( R 109) at 2 ( R
109). But Respondent's waiver of its medical cause defense was not an "implication";
under the Commission's Rules, it was an admission against interest. Mr. Blair put L3/4
and L4/5 at issue when he alleged that he needed surgery at these levels "as a result of his
industrial accident." ( R 7). Respondent's unqualified admission that the accident caused
his low back injuries meant that the accident caused the specific aggravations / injuries
plead by Mr. Blair "as a result of the accident."

2

Under the Commission Rules,
The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim and
shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer shall
state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and
detail that the petitioner and the Division may be fully
informed of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted.

UAR 602.2.1 C; Accord. Barnard & Burk v. Labor Comm % 2005 UT App 40 H 6
(affirmative defenses are waived unless properly raised). The only defense Respondents
raised in the pleadings and at hearing was whether the surgery was appropriate. If
Respondents wanted to dispute whether the aggravations or injuries at L3/4 and L4/5
were caused by the industrial accident, it had to state that defense with sufficient accuracy
and detail so that the Petitioner and the Division were fully informed of that defense.
Instead, they specifically waived that defense.
3

Under the Commission's own Rules, Respondents could only challenge the nature
and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries if it did so "with sufficient accuracy and detail"
to "fully inform" Petitioner and the Commission of the "nature and substance" of its
defense. UAR 602-2-1 C. Consequently, Respondents did not raise the affirmative
defense of medical causation to Petitioner's aggravations or injuries at L3/4 and L4/5. The
Commission erred when it failed to make findings of fact that reflected the facts and issues
resolved by the pleadings and presented for adjudication.
The Commission also countered that "[Respondents'] admission that the accident
was the medical cause of Mr. Blair's injury does not preclude the Commission from
adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr. Blair's work-related low
back problems." Order Affirming ALJ's Decision ( R 109) at 2. But that is precisely how
issues are raised by the pleadings: Petitioners plead facts, and depending on which are
admitted or denied by Respondents, the remaining disputes are left remain to be
adjudicated. In this case the Commission was "precluded from adopting the medical
panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr. Blair's work-related low back problems"
because the pleadings did not leave that issue for adjudication. The Commission does not
have discretion to ignore the parties' pleadings, and arbitrarily adjudicate facts not at issue.
Instead, the Commission's discretion is bound by its own Rules governing pleadings, and
by the disputes raised by the pleadings, and presented for review by the parties. In this
case, the Commission committed legal error when it ignored its own Rules, and tried to

4

adjudicate issues that were already resolved by the pleadings.
This Court should hold that Respondents waived their right to dispute whether
Petitioner aggravated or injured L3/4 and L4/5 when they admitted that the accident was
the medical cause of those injuries. Accordingly, this Court should also reverse the
Commission's findings to the extent that they failed to find Petitioner's low back was
aggravated / injured at L3/4 and L4/5 in his May, 1999 industrial accident.
II.

The Commission Applied The Wrong Legal Standard (Medical
Causation) to Mr. Blair's Surgery Claim, And In Any Case,
Respondents Did Not Raise Medical Causation As A Defense To Mr.
Blair's Surgery Claim.

This Court should reverse the Commission's denial of Mr. Blair's surgical claim for
lack of medical causation, because it was the wrong standard under Mr. Blair's facts, and
because Respondents did not raise a medical cause defense.
The Commission errantly applied the medical cause test to Mr. Blair's surgical
claims, and this Court should reverse the Commission's denial that was based on a lack of
medical cause. Under the Allen case, employees must prove that their accident was both
the legal and medical cause of their injuries, for the employer to be held liable for those
injuries. Allen v. Labor Comm% 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Medical cause is a
requirement for compensable accidents; lack of medical causation is therefore a defense to
a compensable accident.
After having established a compensable accident, however, employers are
responsible for "all medical [costs] resulting from that injury." McKean v. Mountain
5

States Casing, 706 P.2d 601, 602 (employer liable for second degree bums to employee's
hand where industrial accident resulted in loss of feeling to right arm and hand). Put
another way, after proving that they were injured by accident, employees need not prove
that the industrial injuries were the sole cause of the need for their later medical treatment.
Instead, it is well-settled that employers remain liable for the treatment if the industrial
injuries merely "contributes" to the need for medical treatment. McKesson v. Labor
Comm % 2002 UT App. 10, 41 P.3d 468.3 After the employee has established that the
accident was the medical cause of their initial injury, then the employer is liable for the
subsequent medical treatment if the original injury was a contributing cause of the need for
that treatment. In this case, the Commission committed plain error when itapplied medical
causation - instead of contributing cause - as the appropriate standard for Mr. Blair's

3

This Court explained that:
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a subsequent
aggravation to a compensable workplace injury, a claimant
need only prove that his "subsequent injury . . . [is] a natural
result of [his] compensable primary injury." Id. Furthermore,
a claimant need not "'show that his original tragedy was the
sole cause of [his] subsequent injury.™ Id. at 845 (quoting
McKean, 706 P.2d at 602) (emphasis added). Indeed, if the
claimant can show that ""the initial work-related accident [is
merely] a contributing cause' of the subsequent injury," Id. at
845 (quoting McKean, 706 P.2d at 602), the claimant has met
his burden.

McKesson v. Labor Comm % 2002 UT App. 10, If 18, 41 P.3d 468, 472 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
6

subsequent surgery claim. This Court should reverse the Commission's denial for Mr.
Blair's surgery because it applied medical causation instead of contributing cause.
Mr. Blair brought a claim for low back surgery resulting from his May 12, 1999
industrial accident.4 Mr. Blair was forcefully pushing and pulling a 200 pound metal pod
to center it over a baseplate, when he felt a pop, and his back tightened up. Mr. Blair was
the sole witness at his hearing. He testified that he felt leg and low back symptoms shortly
after the accident. Tr. 21-25 ( R 113). He also testified that he continued to experience
low back and leg symptoms in the eight years after the accident and before his hearing,
and that his leg symptoms worsened to the point that his doctor recommended surgery at
L3/4 and L4/5, as a result of his industrial injuries. Tr. 30-38 ( R 113). Because there was
no dispute as to the medical cause of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries, the appropriate
standard was whether the industrial injuries contributed to the need for the proposed
surgery. McKesson, 2002 UT App. at f 18.
As set forth above, the Commission errantly believed it could ignore the parties'
pleadings, and adjudicate the medical cause of Mr. Blair's low back injuries, even though
that defense was not raised.5 Because it believed it could and should adjudicate the
medical cause of Mr. Blair's low back injuries, the Commission did not address whether
the appropriate standard for Mr. Blair's subsequent surgery claim was "contributing
4

Mr. Blair also asserted claims for temporary total disability compensation,
permanent partial compensation, and other related medical expenses. ( R 1-7).
5

See discussion, supra, Part A.
7

cause" instead of "medical cause." See generally, Order Upholding ALJ's Denial. ( R
108-11).
It is well-settled that where a compensable injury occurred, the employer is liable
for subsequent medical treatment if the injury was merely a contributing cause of the need
for the treatment.6 Consistent with the pleadings, this Court should hold that Mr. Blair's
injuries were medically caused by his industrial accident. Accordingly, this Court should
also hold that the Commission erred when it applied the medical causation standard to Mr.
Blair's subsequent surgery claims, and that it should have applied the contributing cause
standard, consistent with well-settled Utah law. This Court should reverse the
Commission's decision and remand Mr. Blair's case for further proceedings.
*

*

#

Having established the narrow disputes to be adjudicated, it was the ALJ's job to
make adequate findings of fact and refer to the panel the question of whether the proposed
surgery was appropriate. But the interim findings were inadequate because they failed to
set forth Mr. Blair's undisputed objective medical findings of intervertebral disc injuries at
multiple levels, and undisputed history of medical treatment with residual left leg
symptoms over the following eight years, culminating in recommended low back surgery.

See n.l supra, and discussion therein.
8

III.

The Interim Findings Were Legally Inadequate Because They Failed To
Set Forth The Undisputed Facts That Demonstrated Petitioner's
Industrial Injuries, and Subsequent Eight Year History Of Low Back
And Leg Symptoms.

The ALJ's Interim Findings of Fact7 were inadequate as a matter of law, because
they failed to make any findings regarding the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's admitted
low back injury, and omitted his subsequent eight year history of low back and leg
symptoms that culminated in his surgical recommendation.
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the
findings must be "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)).... [T]he failure of an agency to
make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its findings
"arbitrary and capricious" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and
capable of only one conclusion." Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm% 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d
241 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). But in the case at bar, the ALJ literally made no
findings as to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's admitted industrial injury, and no
findings as to Mr. Blair's eight year history of industrial low back and leg symptoms.
The Interim Order contained the following relevant findings after Mr. Blair's
industrial accident:
7

While the Commission, and not the ALJ, is the ultimate finder of fact, the
deficiencies in the ALJ's Interim Order led to error and confusion by the medical panel,
were adopted by the ALJ, and never corrected by the Commission. Order Upholding
ALJ's Denial ( R 108-11).
9

However the next morning the Petitioner had enormous pain in
his back. He reported the accident and took the day off.
Shortly thereafter the Petitioner went to see Dr. Carston
Johnston. The Petitioner felt numbness going down the back
of his left thigh (the diagram on ME p. 79 showing the pain as
in the right thigh is incorrect).
Over the years the Petitioner sought treatment for his low back
now and then when it would "act up." Eventually surgery was
recommended by Dr. Jodie Levitt.
Findings of Fact and Interim Order at 2 ( R 37). In other words, there were no findings as
to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's low back injury, and no findings as to his eight year
history of leg and low back symptoms after the accident.
The Interim Order contained no findings as to the nature and scope of Petitioner's
admitted industrial injury. This failure prejudiced Mr. Blair because the Panel was left to
guess what injuries Petitioner sustained or aggravated in the accident. The statute makes
employers liable for injuries and aggravations.8 The post-accident MRJ disclosed three
low back conditions: bulging disc at L3/4, bulging disc at L4/5, and a large disc herniation
at L5/S1. MRE 36, 10 ( R 112). The pleadings established that Mr. Blair's low back was
aggravated / injured at L3/4, L4/5, and L5/S1. But there were no findings as to Mr. Blair's
multiple bulging discs at L3/4 and L4/5, or his large disc herniation from the industrial
8

Employers are liable to employees for "any accident or injury or death, in
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of the employee's employment...." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2105. The Commission's law-trained ALJs are aware of the statute's purposefully broad
formulation, and it is their duty to find the relevant facts to give effect and purpose to the
statute; not to abdicate their fact-finding role to doctors.
10

accident.
The Interim Order contained no findings as to Mr. Blair's low back and leg
symptoms for the eight years following the accident. This failure prejudiced Mr. Blair
because the panel was left to guess what symptoms Mr. Blair exhibited, and whether those
symptoms reasonably supported the proposed surgery. The medical records exhibit
contained over ninety pages of medical records that detailed eight years of Mr. Blair's low
back and leg symptoms that followed the accident, including more than twenty (20)
mentions of left leg and low back symptoms between Mr. Blair's accident and the
hearing.9 Starting with his first visit to the doctor two days after his accident, MRE 83-4 (

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

5-6/99, MRE 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 83-4;
9/99, MRE 36, 38;
10/99, MRE 34;
8/02, MRE 90-93;
9/02, MRE 86, 88;
5/04, MRE 68;
2/05, MRE 61;
3/05, MRE 59;
7/05, MRE 55;
1/06, MRE 50;
3/06, MRE;
4/06, MRE 23;
5/06, MRE 26;
6/06, MRE 22;
9/06, MRE 46;
12/06, MRE 44;
1/07, MRE 45;
1/07 MRE 19;
1/07, MRE 1; and,
4/07, MRE 41.
11

R 112), Mr. Blair's left leg symptoms were mentioned in more than twenty separate
locations in the 94 page medical records exhibit that spanned eight years. From the
Interim Order, however, it appeared that Mr. Blair had left leg symptoms only when he
saw Dr. Johnson shortly after the accident. ( R 37). Mr. Blair was prejudiced by the
Interim Order's failure to make appropriate, detailed findings of fact as to the undisputed
history of leg symptoms contained in the medical record, and Petitioner's undisputed
hearing testimony.
The ALJ's failure to identify the undisputed facts in the Interim Order resulted in
prejudicial and needless questions to the Panel. As set forth above, Respondents did not
dispute the nature or scope of Petitioner's industrial low back injury. To the contrary, they
paid for all of Mr. Blair's medical treatment until the surgical recommendation. The
central dispute was whether the proposed surgery was "appropriate." There was no
dispute as to Mr. Blair's entire industrial medical treatment history.
But the ALJ asked the Panel asked whether all of Mr. Blair's medical treatment
since the accident was due to his accident. Panel Referral Letter (December 19, 2007) at 2
( R 60). This was prejudicial to Mr. Blair because the central issue presented for
adjudication was whether the surgery was appropriate; the parties did not put Mr. Blair's
entire industrial medical treatment history at issue.
Similarly, Mr. Blair sought approval for his proposed surgery, along with pain
clinic visits and/or epidural injections. MRE 18-18A ( R 112). But the ALJ asked the

12

panel to identify Mr. Blair's all of future medical treatment from the accident - without
limitation. Panel Referral Letter (December 19, 2007) at 2 ( R 112). The parties'
pleadings and evidence did not require the ALJ to determine all of Mr. Blair's past and
future medical treatment. Both questions were prejudicial because they ignored
Respondent's admission that the industrial accident was the medical cause of his low back
injuries, and that they only disputed the proposed surgery and related care because they did
not think Mr. Blair would have a good outcome. ( R 10, 17). By putting all of Mr. Blair's
past and future medical treatment at issue, the ALJ ignored the pleadings and evidence, as
well as Respondent's limited defense to Petitioner's limited claims. The panel referral
letter effectively raised the defense of medical causation, even though that was conceded
by the Respondents.
This Court should find that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when
it failed to make essential findings before referring the case to the medical panel. In
particular, it was arbitrary and capricious to make no findings as to the nature and scope of
Mr. Blair's admitted industrial low back injuries, including bulged discs at L3/4 and L4/5,
and his herniated disc at L5/S1. It should also find that the Commission acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when it failed to make findings as to Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg
and low back symptoms, as detailed in numerous entries in the medical records exhibit,
and as Petitioner testified at the hearing. This Court should also find that the Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it asked the medical panel to opine on all of Mr.
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Blair's past industrial medical treatment, when Respondents did not dispute Mr. Blair's
past medical care. This Court should also find that the Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it asked the panel to opine on all of Mr. Blair's future care - without
limitation - when he only asked for surgery and injections. By raising issues before the
medical panel that were well beyond those presented for adjudication, the Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. This Court should remand the case, and require the
Commission to enter detailed findings, consistent with the pleadings, medical records, and
Mr. Blair's undisputed testimony at the hearing. This Court should also remand the case
to determine only the issues presented for adjudication, and not all of Mr. Blair's past and
future related medical treatment.
IV.

The Commission's Findings Were Premised On Legal Error And
Inadequate As a Matter Of Law, Because "Failed To Explain Why It
Rejected Undisputed Record Evidence That Showed Mr. Blair's Eight
Years Of Leg Symptoms After the Accident When It Found That His
Leg Symptoms Had "Essentially Resolved" Within Months After The
Accident

This Court should hold that the Commission's findings of fact were premised on
legal error, because they failed to reflect the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial
injuries as set forth in the pleadings. The findings were also inadequate as a matter of law
because the panel (nor the ALJ, nor the Commission) failed to explain why it discounted
or ignored otherwise uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg and
low back symptoms. At shown above, the Interim Order contained no findings as to the
nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial low back injuries, or his history of leg and low
14

back symptoms.
The ALJ abdicated her fact-finding role when she referred the case to the Panel.
The referral letter stated to the Panel:
[Y]ou are not bound by the discussion of the medical evidence.
You are bound by the Findings of Fact with regard to the facts
of this case. The facts are the historical and other legal data
regarding how the injury occurred, dates and times, places,
persons involved, and other related information commonly
thought of as the situational circumstances surrounding the
alleged injury. If you discover additional facts which are not
contrary to the facts in the Findings of Fact and Interim
Order, and you use them in your examination and evaluation,
it will be necessary to include them in your report and explain
how the additional facts affected your analysis and
conclusions.
Panel referral letter at 2 (emphasis added). Given that there were no findings as to the
nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial low back injuries, and no findings as to his eight
year history of leg and low back symptoms, the letter invited the Panel to make those
findings for the ALJ.
The ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its duty to make findings of fact. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the ALJ/Commission is the finder of fact, and not the
medical panel: "The panel of course performs an important function in giving the
Commission the benefit of its diagnosis relating to those matters that are particularly
within the scope of its expertise. But that is the extent of its prerogative. The final
responsibility of making the decision as to the issues in such a proceeding is given to the
Commission." IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (1978) (disregarding panel legal
15

conclusion as to whether work activities were "unusual" on day of accident). This Court
stated that: "While the ALJ/Commission may convene a medical panel to review
applicants' medical condition, the ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding
responsibility to the medical panel." Speirs v. Southern Utah University, 2002 UT App
389, % 10, 60 P.3d 42, 44 (upholding medical panel determination where the parties'
stipulated facts were presented to the panel). But in this case, the Court tried to delegate
its fact-finding duty to the medical panel on critical factual issues. The results were
disastrous, and illustrate why the ALJ/Commission - and not doctors - must discharge
their legal duty as the ultimate finder of fact.
The undisputed evidence demonstrated Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg and low
back symptoms, but the panel found that these problems went away within months of the
accident:
Based upon review of the medical/chiropractic records, the
medical panel finds that Mr. Blair did sustain on (sic) injury on
5/12/99. He describes a pop followed by severe back pain and
left lower extremity pain the next day. The first imaging study
done thereafter is dated 8/9/99 (sic) and showed a very large
disc protrusion at the L5/S1 level, consistent with those
symptoms. Subsequent to that, however, his symptoms
essentially resolved, including leg pain. Beyond that time,
symptoms are documented only by chiropractors, who provide
evidence of back pain only (not leg symptoms). Imaging
studies done later show resolution of the disc protrusion at L5Sl, and the progression of degenerative disc disease at levels
above L5-S1. The claimant's pattern of symptoms over time
has been consistent with degenerative disc disease, which
would be a pre-existing condition not caused by the accident in
1999. Therefore, the medical panel finds that the medical care
16

provided through 6/9/2000 was reasonably related to the
incident in question. Treatment after 7/2000 is clearly related
to exacerbations of the pre-existing condition - degenerative
disc disease. The disc protrusion apparently caused by the
incident in 1999 has resolved.
Medical panel report at 1 ( R 62) (emphasis added). It was the ALJ/Commission9s legal
duty to find the facts, and was error and folly for the ALJ/Commission to try to delegate
that duty to a doctor.10 It was irrational to expect the panel doctor to make legally

10

Even if it were permissible, it is degrading to the parties and the process
when judges farm out the essential functions of their office, and are ratified by the
Commission. As Judge Orme wrote in the context of law-trained counsel preparing
decisions for ALJ's signature,
Utah ALJs generally — and those adjudicating workers
compensation cases in particular — have routinely prepared
their own findings and conclusions. Their work product has,
with rare exceptions, been excellent, not only because
findings prepared by the actual fact finder are inherently
better than those prepared by a nonneutral delegee one step
removed from decisional responsibility, see generally United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 & n. 4,
84 S.Ct. 1044, 1047 & n. 4, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964), but also
because continual feedback from the Industrial Commission
and from this court, as well as the skill that comes with
repetition and practice, help insure findings that are
sufficiently detailed and otherwise "more helpful to the
appellate court
[I]t would be a shame if ALJs for state
administrative boards and agencies were to reverse direction
and begin regularly delegating the responsibility to counsel.
Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1998)(Orme, J., dissenting in
part)(footnote omitted). If it was bad policy for law-trained counsel to prepare findings
fact for ALJs, it is worse when non-lawyers do so. With due respect to the able medical
experts who staff the medical panel, it is disheartening to the parties and their counsel
when the ALJ's most important task - finding the facts - is delegated to non-lawyers.
17

adequate findings because he was not law-trained and it was not his job to do so. Further,
the panel doctor did consider all of the evidence: He did not attend the hearing, and did not
evaluate the witness, much less hear Petitioner's testimony about his accident or
subsequent eight year history of leg and low back symptoms. Further, the panel doctor
could not have become aware of that history due to the Interim Order's lack of findings.11
It was arbitrary and capricious to for the ALJ to foist fact-finding onto a physician, who
was not law-trained and did not hear the parties' testimony.
The medical records demonstrated Mr. Blair's consistent leg and low back
symptoms, beginning with his date of accident, and continuing until the time of hearing.
The panel found that Petitioner's symptoms resolved after his September, 1999, MRI.
Medical Panel Report at 1 ( R 62). But of the twenty-plus mentions of leg pain in the
medical records exhibit, eighteen of them occurred after the September, 1999 MRI - the
date the panel said that Mr. Blair's low back and leg symptoms "essentially resolved."
Medical panel report at 1 ( R 62). Despite the numerous mentions of left leg symptoms in
the medical records exhibit, the panel made no attempt to reconcile its statement that Mr.
Blair's symptoms had "essentially resolved" with the record evidence that demonstrated
eight years of leg and low back symptoms that culminated in his surgical recommendation.
The panel also rejected evidence of leg and low back symptoms because they were
documented "only by chiropractors" with no explanation as to why that evidence should be

11

See discussion supra, Part II.
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disregarded.
Clearly, the panel rejected the medical evidence of Mr. Blair's leg and low back
symptoms to reach its conclusion that his symptoms had resolved by 1999. But it offered
no explanation for its actions; a reviewing court can not determine if the evidence was
even considered, much less how it was weighed by the panel. The ALJ/Commission did
not explain the obvious contradictions between the medical evidence that showed Mr.
Blair's history of leg and low back symptoms, and the panel's conclusion that those
symptoms resolved within months of the accident. Under similarly undisputed evidence,
the Supreme Court has directed that the Labor Commission can not "arbitrarily []
discount all competent, uncontradicted evidence. We think it can% but did so here, calling
for a reversal." Baker v. Indus. Comm 'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 144 (1965) (emphasis in
original)(employee's indefinite statements as to cause of injury, in connection with other
undisputed evidence, did not defeat her claim). But in this case, the only rationale offered
by the ALJ/Commission to reject the undisputed medical and non-medical evidence, was
that the panel was "impartial," and that its "findings are based on the evidence in the
record." Order Affirming ALJ's Denial at 2 ( R 109). But that statement begged the
12

For example, on a chiropractic treatment note dated 8/26/2002, there was a
pain diagram that showed the low back circled, and a wavy line down the back of the left
leg, with the following notation: "WIC 5-12-99. lifting plate metal moving it around,
pain started that evening, ruptured disc.sharp, needles down leg, pain calf radiating to L
leg." MRE 93 ( R 112). Consistent with Mr. Blair's undisputed hearing testimony, he
experienced ongoing low back and leg symptoms since his industrial accident, and these
symptoms were documented by his medical providers. The panel simply disregarded this
evidence without explanation.
19

question of the adequacy of the findings themselves, and did not speak to why much of
Mr. Blair's supporting evidence was rejected, and how the remaining evidence was
weighed.
The findings were not "sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate factual conclusions . . . [were] reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot
perform its duty . . . of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious
administrative action." Adams, 821 P.2d at 5. This Court should find that the findings as
to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries, and his symptom history that
culminated in his surgical recommendation, were inadequate as a matter of law. This
Court should remand the case for additional detailed findings as to the nature and scope of
Mr. Blair's industrial low back injury, and his history of leg and low back symptoms,
consistent with the pleadings and undisputed record evidence.
V.

It Is Inappropriate to Require Marshaling Of The Evidence Under Mr.
Blair's Facts.
JL

Assuming Arguendo That The Pleadings Did Not Resolve The Nature
and Scope of Mr. Blair's Industrial Injuries, The Panel's Failure To
Disclose Why It Rejected Undisputed Record Evidence of
Petitioner's Aggravation / Injuries at L3/4 and L4/5 Makes
Marshaling The Evidence Inappropriate.

Mr. Blair takes issue with the findings both as to 1) the nature and scope of his
industrial injury, and 2) as to his eight year history of leg and low back symptoms, for the
reasons set forth above. Mr. Blair asserts that his industrial injury encompassed the
aggravations / injuries at L3/4 and L4/5, along with his herniated disc at L5/S1. This issue
20

was resolved as a matter of law by the pleadings.

13

Assuming arguendo that this was an

open question, however, the medical panel only acknowledged the L5/S1 disc injury. The
same MRI that disclosed the herniated disc at L5/S1, also showed disc bulges at the two
levels above the herniation: L3/4 and L4/5. (MRE 10, R 112). The statute encompasses
both aggravations and discrete injuries under accident claims. Consequently, the issue was
not whether the panel's finding was supported by substantial evidence; instead, the issue
was why the panel did not also include Mr. Blair's disc bulges or alternatively, if the
bulges were present, why the panel did not also find that those adjacent discs were
permanently aggravated in the accident. The panel did not explain why it included only
one (L5/S1) of the three damaged discs as part of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries, and
excluded aggravations/injuries to the other two damaged levels (L3/4 and L4/5). It is
inappropriate to require marshalling of the evidence where the findings were incomplete,
because some evidence supported the incomplete findings, while other evidence was either
never considered, or rejected without explanation.14
2.

Marshaling The Evidence In Support Of The Finding Is Only Possible
Where There Was Supporting Evidence, And Because Mr. Blair
Found None. Marshaling Was Either Impossible, or The Finding Was
Not Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Similarly, Mr. Blair challenges the Panel's finding that his low back and leg
symptoms "essentially resolved" within months of the accident because his testimony and

13

See Discussion supra, Part A.

14

See Discussion supra, Part C.
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112). In May, 2004, Mr. Blair stated that he still had "pain in lower back and tingling
down left leg. MRE 68 ( R 112). In February and March, 2005, there were pain diagrams
that show low back and left leg symptoms, and Mr. Blair's complaint was still "lower back
pain" and "left leg tingling." MRE 61, 59 ( R 112). His doctors noted left leg and low
back pain in July, 2005, MRE 55 ( R 112), in January, 2006, and March 2006, MRE 50, 49
(R112).
In April, 2006, Mr. Blair complained of low back and leg problems to Dr. Jodie
Leavitt, and continued into May and June, 2006. MRE 23, 26, 22 (R 112). In September,
Dr. Davis again noted low back and leg problems. MRE 46 ( R 112). Dr. Davis took Mr.
Blair off work in December, 2006, noting "lower back pain & spasms & leg pain with
numbness and tingling." and noted continuing low back and leg problems in January,
2007. MRE 44, 45 ( R 112). Those symptoms were again confirmed by Dr. Jodie Leavitt.
MRE 19 ( R 112). Dr. Davis took Mr. Blair off work again in April 2007 because of
"lower back and leg pain." MRE 41, 42 ( R 112).
Even Respondents' examining physician, Dr. Moress, did not dispute Mr. Blair's
history of leg and low back symptoms since the accident. To the contrary, Dr. Moress
described Mr. Blair as having "intermittent back pain" since his May, 1999 industrial
accident. MRE 16. Mr. Blair testified at his July, 2007 hearing, that he had never been
pain-free since the accident. Tr. 31 ( R 113).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the Commission's
Findings of Fact to the extent they conflict with the industrial injuries admitted in
Respondents Answer, and find that its actions exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality. This Court should also find that the Commission applied the wrong legal
standard (legal causation) to Mr. Blair's subsequent surgery claim and that in any case the
medical cause defense had already been waived. This Court should find that the
Commission abused its discretion and that the Commission's findings were legally
inadequate because they failed to set forth the undisputed facts of Petitioner's industrial
injuries, and subsequent eight year history of leg and low-back symptoms and rejected that
evidence without explanation. This Court, should also find that the Commission's findings
were premised on legal error and that it abused its discretion when it objected undisputed
record evidence of Mr. Blair's eight years of leg and low-back symptoms following his
accident and that his leg and low-back symptoms had "essentially resolved eight years
after the accident without explanation."
Finally, Mr. Blair is not required to marshal the supporting evidence as to
Petitioner's history of leg and low back symptoms because they were inadequate as a
matter of law and marshaling is only appropriate where the facts are legally adequate. Nor
is Mr. Blair required to marshal the evidence in support of the finding that his low back
and leg symptoms had "essentially resolved," because there was no supporting evidence
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APPENDIX

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search

Title/Chapter/Section:]

LO^ISl

Utah Code
Title 34A Utah Labor Code
Chapter 1 Labor Commission Act
Section 301 Commission jurisdiction and power.

34A-1-301. Commission jurisdiction and power.
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 34AQ1 030100.ZIP 1,553 Bytes
« Previous Section (34A-1-205)

Next Section (34A-1-302) »

Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy

Utah Code
Title 34A Utah Labor Code
Chapter 2 Workers' Compensation Act
Section 105 Exclusive remedy against empk • v.

•*>

»•. 1 over

J4A L- Mb. Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, agent, or employee of employer.
(1) 1 he right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee,
whethci resulting in death or i .ot, is the exclusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive
reined} against am officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer
imposed b\ this chapter is in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or
otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of
kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in
the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action, at law may not
be maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based
upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee. Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the
employee's dependents, from filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance with Chapter
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) The exclusive remedy provision,, oi iiu:, ,>caion apfnv ^ • - m mc uiem ana
employer organization in a coemployment relationship regulated under Til lr " 1 \ - y
*•>,
Professional Employer Organization Licensing Ac!
(3) (a) For purposes of this section:
(i) 'Temporary employee" means an indi * idu.ii AIIW i* < i. u . i.r %ork assignment is:
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing company: or
(B) registered by or otherwise as>ocialed w ith a temporal) staffing company.
(ii) "Temporary staffing compain" means a company that engages in the assignment ^ f indi\ uiuals as
temporary full-time or nnrf-fimr r-nmipyC{^ *- •*H a Nmnmrnts ?h a finite ending date i- mother
independent entity.
(b) If the temporary staffing company secures the payment oi workers' compensation :i> aiu^-unce
with Section 34A-2-201 for all temporary employees of the temporan .staffing eompam. die exclusive
remedy provisions of this section apply to both the temporary staffing company and the client con-r
and its employees and provide the temporaiy staffing company the same protection that a client
company and its employees has under (his section for the acts of any of the temporary staffing
company's tcmnr.raiy employees on assignment at the client company worksite.
\mended b> (Ihaptei ^ 18, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code
Title 34A Utah Labor Code
Chapter 2 Workers' Compensation Act
Section 401 Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.

34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the dependents of each such
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment,
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services;
(ii) medicines; and
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses.
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be:
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and
(b) not on the employee.
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall
commence within 30 calendar days after any final award by the commission.
Amended by Chapter 55, 1999 General Session
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1. The day of the act, event, finding, or default, or the date
a n Order is issued, shall not be included;
2. The last day of the period so computed shall be included,
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a state legal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next working
day:
3. When the period of time prescribed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and state legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation;
4. No additional time for mailing will be allow* <l
M 8 2 - 1 - 2 . Witness F e e s .
Each witness who shall appear before the Commission by its
order shall receive from the Commission for his/her attendance fees and mileage as provided for witnesses by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, each party is required to
subpoena witnesses at their own expense
R e f e r e n c e s : 34A-1-302, 63-46b-l et seq.
History: 10879, AMD, 08/01/90, 10918, NSC, 07/10/90;
10661, NSC, 07/25/90; 11470, AMD, 02/01/91; 13351, AMD,
10/15/92; 13517, AMD, 12/01/92; 13518, AMD, 12/01/92;
14635, AMD, 08/31/93; 15488, NSC, 03/01794; 15490, NSC,
03/01/94; 17089, AMD, 08/31/95; 17524, NSC, 01/22/96; 17937,
AMD, 10/01/96, 18179, AMD, 12/03/96; 19304, NSC, 07/01/97,
20258, SYR, 11/24/97
NOTES TO DECISIONS
A p p l i c a b l e law.
Rule requiring claimant's industrial accident be a "significant" cause of disability when worker had already qualified for
Social Security benefits and which was promulgated after
worker's industrial accident, but before worker's application
for a hearing before the Industrial Commission, could not be
applied retroactively. The general rule in workers' compensation cases is that the court is to apply the law existing at the
time of injury. (Former R490-1-17.) Abel v Industrial Comm'n,
860 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Claims,
R602-2-1.
R602-2-2.
R602-2-3.
R602-2-4.
:
l602-2-5.

Pleadings and Discover).
Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Compensation for Medical Testimonv
Attorney Fees
Settlement Agreements

X602-2-1. P l e a d i n g s a n d Discovery.
A. For the purposes of this rule, "Commission" means the
^abor Commission. "Division" means the Division of Adjudiafcton within the Labor Commission. Adjudicative proceedugs for workers' compensation and occupational disease
laims may be commenced by the injured worker or dependent
iling a request for agency action with the Commission. The
administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion in allowing
atervention of other parties pursuant to Section 63-46b-9
l i e Application for Hearing is the request for agency action
dl such applications shall include supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a dispute over medical
ssues. Applications without supporting documentation will
fit be mailed to the employer or insurance carrier for answer
m i l t h e appropriate documents have been provided.
B . Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by
a employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on t h e
pphcant to initiate the action by filing an Application for
fearing with the Commission
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C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy to
the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days
following the date of the mailing of the application to file a
written answer with the Commission, admitting or denying
liability for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative
defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail t h a t an applicant
may be fully informed of the n a t u r e of the defense asserted. All
answers shall include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A copy shall be sent to the
applicant or, if there is one, to the applicant's attorney by the
defendant.
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an
answer within the 30 days provided above, the Commission
may enter a default against such employer or insurance
carrier. The Commission may then set the matter for hearing,
take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based
on the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant employer
or insurance carrier and may not be construed to deprive the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers'
Fund of any appropriate defenses.
F When the answer denies liability solel> on the medical
aspects of the case, the applicant, through his/her attorney or
agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the approval of the Commission or its representative, may enter into
a stipulated set of facts, which stipulation, together with the
medical documents bearing on the case in the Commission's
file, may be used in making t h e final determination of liability.
G When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its representatives may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence
discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well
as past and present medical care. The defendant shall also be
entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to allow
gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may
also require the applicant to submit to a medical examination
by a physician of the defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in the dismissal
of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
I Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery
proceedings and shall be signed, unless good cause is shown
for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled
hearing.
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its
insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit at least one week
before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and
submit all pertinent medical records contained in his/her file
to the employer or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit
submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing.
Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed binder arranged by
care provider in chronological order. Exhibits shall include all
relevant treatment records which tend to prove or disprove a
fact m issue. Pages shall be numbered consecutively. Hospital
nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant
materials may not be included.
K The Administrative Law Judge shall be notified one week
m advance of any proceeding when it is anticipated t h a t more
than four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated
that the hearing of the evidence will require more than two
hours.
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative
proceeding shall be issued m accordance with the provisions of
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10.
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain
review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by

